Veilora
How We Test
We don't claim — we measure. Every reliability number on this site comes from probing real censored networks, ISP by ISP, and we publish our limitations alongside our results.
Why measurement is hard (and why most claims are meaningless)
Internet censorship is not a national switch. It is enforced per network — each ISP (technically, each Autonomous System, or ASN) runs its own deep-packet-inspection (DPI) policy. A protocol that connects fine on one carrier can be silently throttled or blackholed on the one next door.
That means a VPN tested once, from a single connection, tells you almost nothing. A credible reliability number has to be measured from inside many real networks, in the actual country — not from a data-center lab. So that's what we do.
Our method
Map the censorship
From residential connections inside each country, across many ISPs, we probe which sites are actually blocked — and how (full drop, SNI filtering, or intermittent).
Validate the bypass
We route the same probes through our production VLESS + Reality tunnel and measure how many blocked hosts come back. That share, averaged across ISPs, is our bypass rate — confirmed across both XHTTP and Vision transports.
Monitor continuously
Censors adapt and IPs get blackholed without warning. Servers are re-probed every 2 hours from censored networks, so we catch and rotate a failing one before complaints — not after.
What we measured
Multi-country survey, May 2026. Bypass rate = share of blocked hosts restored through the Reality tunnel, averaged across the listed number of distinct ISPs (ASNs).
| Country | ASNs tested | Reality bypass | Sample of what's blocked locally |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🇹🇷 Turkey | 12 | ~91–93% | Discord, eSIM providers, VPN sites, piracy, adult |
| 🇵🇰 Pakistan | 13 | ~98% | Telegram (federal), adult |
| 🇮🇳 India | 21 | ~92% | Adult, piracy, TikTok; inconsistent per-ISP |
| 🇮🇩 Indonesia | 14 | ~96–99% | Adult, Reddit, piracy, 4chan |
| 🇦🇪 UAE | 3 (all ISPs) | baseline only* | VPN sites, dating, adult, gambling — nearly total |
* For the UAE we mapped the censorship but did not run the bypass round: the UAE's defining restriction is on VoIP calls (WhatsApp/FaceTime), which is a UDP problem our HTTP-based probe doesn't measure. We'd rather report nothing than report a number we didn't earn. See limitations below.
What the map looks like — example: Turkey
Step 1 produces a censorship map for every country. Here is Turkey (13 ISPs): the share of networks where each service was blocked.
See the full Censorship Map 2026 → all five countries, service by service.
What our data can't tell you (honest limitations)
Anyone can publish a flattering number. Trust comes from knowing where the number stops being reliable — so here is exactly where ours does:
- Residential probes are noisy (~15–20%). Sessions drop, and occasionally an ISP we requested is swapped for another. Every figure above is computed from validated sessions only — runs where neutral control sites (Google, Wikipedia, Signal) also responded.
- "Block type" is approximate for non-Russian targets. We report a host as reachable or not; we don't over-claim the exact mechanism behind each block.
- UAE VoIP is not covered by this HTTP method. Websites unblock fine through the tunnel, but voice/video calls are a separate (UDP) problem we test separately.
- DPI is probabilistic and regional. The same network can pass one minute and throttle the next, which is exactly why we monitor continuously rather than trusting a single snapshot.
- Samples are per-ASN, not exhaustive. ~13–21 ISPs per country is a strong signal, not a census of every network in the country.
Why we don't publish the full recipe
This is a censorship-circumvention tool. We deliberately do not publish the specific evasion parameters — the exact masking domains, transport tuning, and frontier techniques our servers use. Publishing them would simply hand censors a checklist to block.
So we share what is censored and how well modern protocols survive it — the public-interest part — while keeping the operational details that protect our users private. Transparency about results; discretion about methods that can be weaponized.
Frequently asked
How does Veilora measure VPN reliability?
We probe real ISPs in each country from residential connections to record what's actually blocked, then route the same tests through our production VLESS + Reality tunnel and measure how many blocked sites come back — averaged across many ISPs.
How often do you re-test your servers?
Every two hours, from real censored networks — so a degraded or blackholed server is caught and rotated before users complain.
Why don't you publish your exact bypass configuration?
Publishing the specific evasion parameters would simply help censors block them. We share our results and our method — but not the operational recipe.
Reliability you can verify
Free tier includes 10 GB/month — no credit card. Test it on your own network.
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